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The general strike which held up last week's New Republic has been called off, pending the finding of the War Labor Board. The delayed number is therefore being issued with the current one.

PRESIDENT WILSON is certainly to be congratulated on the enemies he has made, the issue on which their enmity is based and the violence with which they express it. If he needed any justification for breaking the party truce, the Republicans have furnished it after the event by the clear evidence they have given of their irreconcilable and embittered personal hostility to him. It is not only true, as we point out elsewhere, that they had already broken the party truce in all but name, but it is obvious they were merely waiting for an opportunity of turning on him and of making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to conduct the government of the country. Undoubtedly they would not have become obstructionists as long as the military aspect of the war remained uppermost, but the military aspect is no longer uppermost. The military victory has been won and the Republicans know it. National and international political issues are coming to the surface. The Republicans would have used a majority in Congress to frustrate Mr. Wilson's political measures. He did not, as Chairman Hays says, "impugn Republican loyalty and deny their patriotism." He did not "insult every loyal Republican in the land." He merely asked the voters not to elect to the Congress a Republican majority which, as the Republicans proclaim, would have done its best to prevent his leadership from being effective.

NO question of loyalty is involved by this issue between the President and the Republican leaders. The Republicans as the party in opposition have every right to oppose the President's programme, except in so far as they have already either silently or expressly consented to it. But Mr. Wilson as the executive leader of the nation is equally entitled to safeguard his programme against a plain threat of future obstruction. He is the only possible legal leader of the American people during the next two years. If the voters elect a majority in the next Congress hostile to him, the nation will at one of the most critical moments in history be practically without an effective and responsible government. The President was obliged to ask for a vote of continued popular confidence as a matter of governmental convenience and personal prestige. The Republicans are no doubt placed by his appeal in a trying position. During the war they have had all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of participating in a coalition government, and as soon as the war is over the President pushes them aside. But they should charge the responsibility for this necessity, not on the President but upon the Constitution. As long as the Chief Executive is irremovable for four years except by impeachment, and is legally independent of Congress, the responsibility for the gov-

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ernment of the country is necessarily lodged in his person. He is obliged to appeal for the support needed to redeem his responsibility. He can no longer count on it from both parties. He must seek it, consequently, for and from his own party.

THE Republicans will commit a grave mistake in case they continue to conduct their quarrel with the President in the spirit shown by Chairman Hays' recent shriek of defiance. When he declares that Mr. Wilson proposes "to give to Germany out of hand the fruits of a victory greater than she could win by fighting for a hundred years" he is going far too far. The enormous majority of his readers will contrast the greatness of Mr. Wilson's services to the cause of world democracy and his prodigious reputation abroad with the feeble intemperance and the despicable falseness of the accusation. They will infer that such an indictment against President Wilson could have been uttered only by a cheap and reckless partisan hack and they will reflect that a cause which is officially defended by such wild misrepresentation is likely to be morally dubious. The Republicans should beware. They are in danger of becoming committed to a wholly reactionary policy both at home and abroad, and they are in danger of conducting the agitation on behalf of their policy in the spirit of fanatical and febrile violence. If they succumb to this danger they will expose themselves, from such a skillful and resourceful political fighter as Mr. Wilson, to a crushing rejoinder. The Republicans possess all the materials which they need for carrying on a vital and thoroughgoing political controversy with the President. It is important for the education of American public opinion that they vigorously oppose his programme and propose an equally realistic programme of their own. But if they think they are fighting effectively by accusing him of unconditionally surrendering to Germany and of pandering to Marxian socialism and Bolshevism, they are egregiously mistaken. They cannot agitate against such a formidable antagonist as the President unless they "demobilize" some of their feelings and "mobilize" their brains.

AUSTRIA'S hands are up. That is the plain meaning of the reply of the Austro-Hungarian government to the President's note of October 19th. The Dual Empire has formally accepted the necessity of dismemberment implied in the President's intimation that the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs are to gain their independence. In one respect the Austro-Hungarian government goes farther than was required. "It adheres also to the same point of view contained in the last note upon the rights of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, especially those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs." There is no need to hold up negotiations to ascertain whether Austria-Hungary agrees to a democratic determination of the rights of the Rumanians in Transylvania and the Poles in Galicia. She has signed an agreement in blank. Is there a trap here which we must uncover by further fighting? Not even the most acute trap diviners are asserting this. Austria-Hungary is not sparring for time, because time is not a desideratum in a state where events are rapidly going from bad to worse. Nor does anyone see any profit in keeping the war going for the sake of killing more Austro-Hungarians. There are more Czecho-Slovaks and the like in Austria's army than Germans and Magyars. If we were to annihilate that army we should kill more friends than foes.

GERMANY'S case is more complicated. That she is defeated nobody either in the Allied world or in Germany questions for a moment. But whether her hands are up or not cannot be asserted with confidence until we see what kind of armistice terms she will accept. The general character of the terms that will be imposed are known to all the world. They will make Germany impotent for resistance to whatever final terms of peace the Allies choose to dictate. If Germany is really ready to accept such an armistice, fighting is practically at an end. With the exception of a few romantic enthusiasts for blood letting, nobody in the Allied world cares to get by fighting what can be had without fighting. But can what we want be had without fighting? There is no doubt that the majority of the German people would accept the Allied terms without reservation. They are sick of the war, sick of military prestige, sick of autocratic tutelage. They have won initial victories in Prussian electoral reform, in transferring power to the Reichstag, above all in deposing Ludendorff—an enterprise which even the Kaiser would not have dared to undertake if the General Staff still enjoyed its old power. But constitutionalism in Germany trembles under the fear of a military coup d'état. There will be no safety either for German liberalism or for the world until the German military machine has been dismantled. That is what the armistice will accomplish.

IF any German "traps" have been set, we are not going to find them where the light is most pitiless, in all that pertains to the western front and to the high seas. If anywhere, the Germans may expect to "trap" us in the twilight zone of the eastern border. In Finland, in the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and especially in the Ukraine, there

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are German military forces serving as a background for a vast network of intrigues for the perpetuation of German influence, political and economic. We know exactly how the Germans will defend the maintenance of their armies in the border states. They would willingly withdraw; but shall they abandon those states to anarchy? There may be individuals in the Allied world who can be taken in by this argument. It is not easy to distinguish between the "anarchy" that would naturally have characterized the transition in Russia from an autocratic to a popular regime and the anarchy which the Germans have created and are continuing to create for their own purposes. The Allied governments, however, will surely not permit themselves to be deceived. The armistice must demand the instant withdrawal from Russia and the border province of German military forces.

Why the President Did It

PRESIDENT Wilson's appeal to his fellow countrymen to elect a Democratic majority in both houses of the new Congress was a courageous and salutary political utterance. It restores the practice of free public discussion to American politics, and the restoration of this practice was indispensable to the health of the American political body. As we pointed out in our last issue, democracy in America was suffering because the party truce had deprived political discussion of all vitality and was being used by the more violent elements in American opinion to hypnotize and blind the American people. The voters in preparing to elect a new set of national representatives on November 5th were moving in a dense fog without chart or leadership. They had obtained no indication and no pledges as to what the convictions of the new Congressmen were in reference to their work of bringing the war to an end and of beginning the process of domestic reorganization. President Wilson has saved them from going to the polls in utter darkness. He has given them something to vote for at the coming election besides an empty and misleading loyalty. He has asked them to support him, and it is devoutly to be hoped they will respond in generous measure to his appeal. The war will not be brought to a successful political conclusion unless they rally to his assistance.

Because he has broken the truce, the Republicans charge him with offensive partisanship and want of patriotism. But the truth is that they themselves had broken the truce in all but name. They are supporting now nothing but the military policy of the administration, and the coming Congress will have practically nothing to do with military action in its effect on the winning of the great war. They had clearly betrayed their intentions of fighting his management of the politics of the war and of frustrating his plans for bringing it to a successful conclusion. If the President has erred, he has erred only in conniving for so long at the suppression of a wholesome and stimulating clash of political opinion. The success of his peace programme is imperilled at the present time chiefly because he has in the past not sufficiently encouraged the discussion of it. Fortunately, the Republicans came to his assistance just in time. By allowing their hostility to his conduct of the war to break out before the election, they gave him a valid excuse for a strong and explicit appeal to the voters for personal support.

Consider, for instance, the way in which the Republican leaders and newspapers dealt with the President's last reply to Germany. Their comment on it exposed an irreconcilable and unmistakable hostility to a just and enduring settlement of the war and their intention of carrying over to the peace discussion a group of exclusively military considerations. The President's last note to the German government safeguarded to the limit every immediate military interest of the anti-German alliance. It demanded the most thoroughgoing and humiliating repudiation by the German people of their offensive political leadership. It exacted the completest conceivable renunciation of militarism and military control over political action. But the Republicans are not satisfied. They condemn him because he has undertaken and continued a discussion with Germany. They ignore the fact that the discussion has obtained political and military results of enormous value, which otherwise might have cost billions of treasure and thousands of lives. The motive of their condemnation was only too plain. They foresaw that the discussion presupposed the assumption of an obligation on the part of this country to use this complete military victory for the attainment of certain previously specified conditions of a just peace, and the idea of binding this or any other member of the Alliance to redeem such a promise and to allow justice to interfere with vindictive feeling and selfish interest was abhorrent to them. Ex-President Taft, the chief of an American organization to promote peace with justice, is jubilant, because in his opinion Mr. Wilson's last note will result in the total emasculation of the only authoritative attempt to define international justice which can possibly bind this or any other country, viz., the fourteen points. Mr. Roosevelt, on the other hand, considers the fourteen points sufficiently alive to be denounced as "thoroughly mischievous." The "peace of righteousness" for which he has always contended turns out in practice to be a peace the laws of

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which are applied one way in the case of our friends and another way in the case of our enemies. All the Republican Senators quoted are equally emphatic in their opposition. The New York Tribune declares that "Mr. Wilson's principles are acceptable to Germany," "but not to the people of the United States." A settlement based on the fourteen points would be a "political victory for Germany."

If the Republicans really believe that the fourteen points are "thoroughly mischievous," and if impartially applied would result in "a political victory for Germany," they are, of course, bound to fight President Wilson's peace programme tooth and nail. In that event we are on the verge of one of the most momentous and probably one of the most embittered political discussions through which the American nation has ever passed. The President of the United States, after leading his fellow countrymen through a victorious war, in which from the start he clearly announced his intention of using victory for the purpose of obtaining a just and a healing peace, is accused by his political opponents, when he attempts to redeem his promise, of proposing terms "which imply the unconditional surrender of the United States" and the "political victory of Germany." If this indictment is true, if President Wilson has asked his fellow countrymen to undergo such huge sacrifices in order to win a political victory for the enemy, what are we to think of the President? But what if it is not true? Suppose these critics are wilfully perverting his programme in accusing him of betraying the cause of the Allies and the moral interests of his fellow countrymen. What in that case are we to think of his critics?

Confronted as he was by an attack which sought to frustrate the fulfillment of the most essential aspect of his political conduct of the war, what alternative had the President but to end a party truce which tied his hands but not those of his opponents? His own good faith as a man and his future credit as a statesman were staked absolutely on his ability to carry out the political programme now condemned by Mr. Roosevelt as "Unconditional surrender to Germany." In every public statement which he has uttered or published since the beginning of the war he has opposed an essentially punitive, vindictive and violent settlement, such as that now favored by the Republicans. If the Germans finally accept his last demands, if they both disarm and arrange a complete democratization of their system of government, and if after that he should fail to obtain for them the benefit of equal rights under any new system of international code or within any new society of nations, President Wilson would present a sorry figure. He would go down in history as a colossal and unmitigated four-flusher. Now that his enemies are frankly and furiously attacking the whole spirit and purpose of his management of the war, he would, if he failed to fight, be faithless to his supporters here and abroad, to his plain obligations and his own most cherished convictions and principles. The one way in which he could fight effectively was to end the party truce and to appeal to his fellow countrymen for their continued personal support.

The Republicans are replying that the war belongs not to President Wilson but to the American people. In demanding a purely punitive peace, which will perpetuate the international competition for power which was an indispensable condition of the war, they are interpreting the living will of the American people. So be it. That is the issue. The war does, of course, belong to the American people, but the President considers himself to be a better interpreter of the interests and aspirations of the American people than are the Republicans. He has plausible grounds for the belief. He persuaded his fellow countrymen to renounce their neutrality at a moment when they were divided and troubled in spirit and needed firm and enlightened leadership. He aroused their moral enthusiasm for the war by associating it with the fulfillment of the traditional American national aspirations on behalf of a more pacific and more righteous international order. No doubt they did not fully understand what the implications were of the bond forged by the President between American participation in the war and the organization of a League of Nations as the indispensable instrument of international justice. They could reach such an understanding only after a searching and exhaustive public debate. But they consented to the President's interpretation of the politics of the war by the acclamations with which they received his words, just as the President's opponents, with the exception of Mr. Roosevelt, consented by silence, by failing to serve notice of future protest. If the American people should revoke their earlier consent, they would not be violating any written bond, but they could nevertheless be fairly accused of perfidiousness. They gave the people of the world to believe through their official spokesman that they wished to exalt a military victory over Germany into a greater victory for the Golden Rule in international politics. The Republicans are now asking them to revoke that promise. President Wilson is asking them to make it good. That is the ultimate meaning of the ending of the party truce and the President's appeal to the American people for an emphatic and unequivocal expression of continued confidence.

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Nationalism and Internationalism

IN England, in France, in Italy no less than in Poland and in the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav territories, the events of the war have produced a great intensification of national spirit. The same thing is true of America. We are more of a unified, self-conscious nation than ever before. Sectionalism, which not more than two years ago appeared to be a growing force in this country, has all but disappeared. We are hearing practically nothing of the peculiar needs and demands of South or Far West, New England or the central industrial district. Officially and unofficially, we are emphasizing the points in which the interests of labor and capital coincide and slurring the points in which they conflict. And in so far as we are thinking at all about reconstruction policies, we are instinctively adopting the premise that the interest of each group in our nation is the interest of all. After the war we mean to see that the aliens living among us are assimilated. We mean to see that opportunity is placed within the reach of all. Ignorance, inefficiency, and poverty we already recognize as national as well as individual problems. All this means that national problems, national interests are increasingly engrossing the thought of the average man. America, and America first. That is to be in the future a fundamental principle in our politics.

But how does this intensified nationalism comport with the internationalism implied in a League of Nations? That depends entirely upon what internationalism means. Does it mean that we must love our own country but other countries as well or better? Does it mean that we are to judge dispassionately between the interests of our own country and the conflicting interests of other countries? Or does it mean something still more extreme, the complete extinction of the concept "our country," as the anarchists and various socialistic minorities conceive it? Then, in our present mood we will have none of it. If we must choose between nationalism and internationalism in this sense we will remain nationalists. And if that makes impossible a League of Nations, we shall do without it.

But who gave the anarchists and Bolsheviki the right to determine the content of the term internationalism, to fix upon it a sense that is inherently absurd? "Internationalism: a political ideal resting on the premise that nations are imaginary entities, or at most political devices whereby the privileged minority can set against one another the workers of the world who would otherwise compose one homogeneous humanity." Call that cosmopolitanism or what you will, it is not internationalism. Unless there are nations, real, unified, self-conscious, internationalism is a logical absurdity. So is a League of Nations. You cannot be an internationalist unless you are a nationalist. And the League of Nations has no place for a member state which does not recognize interests of its own which it intends to defend. Such a member could not be expected to recognize the interests of other states, or to defend them.

If then America enters the League of Nations, it is to be understood in advance that she enters as a highly self-conscious nation, determined to realize, not to surrender, her national interests. She will engage not to make unprovoked war upon her neighbors, and she will accept the principle that if she violates this engagement she will have declared war, not upon one country alone but upon the whole community of nations. America will engage herself along with the rest of the nations to go to the relief of any member of the League who is unlawfully attacked. In all this, what surrender of the national interest is involved? Have we not all come to a realization of the fact that in attacking Russia, France and Belgium, Germany was attacking us? Do we not understand that under modern conditions of warfare neutrality is an impossible position? The very men who are protesting most vigorously against our making ourselves responsible, jointly with the other nations, for the peace of the world, are the ones who most bitterly reproach us because we did not take immediate action upon the invasion of Belgium. We should have acted as if we had made ourselves responsible for peace. They agree that in the future we must act in this way. This means that they do not oppose internationalism but only organized internationalism. They are against a formal League of Nations, but they are staunch advocates of an international vigilance committee.

But a League of Nations would exert at least a modicum of control over armaments, and that would mean a limitation upon national freedom of action. Let us see. Who determined the British naval programme in the last decade before the war? The British people? No; the Germans. "The latest German navy law has increased the number of vessels we require to construct each year," declared the First Lord of the British Admiralty in introducing the estimates for 1913. For every two keels Germany laid Britain had to lay down three. Thus the British citizen, who by centuries of struggle had established the principle that no power in England but his own will could levy taxes upon him, had to submit to increased taxation at the whim of the Kaiser and von Tirpitz. France was not free to determine on purely na-

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tional grounds whether her young men should spend two years or three in the standing army. The determination was made for her, in Berlin, when the German military programme was promulgated. Nor was Germany free to determine her own military programme. She had to direct her policy according to the policies she imputed to France and Russia. And if the competition of armaments continues after this war, America will find the control of her military policy taken out of her hands. The American Defense Society may demand universal service, but whether we can afford this or not will depend upon how much money we have left after providing the navy and the technical services that will have been imposed upon us, without our wish or consent, by nations we must regard as potential enemies.

If then through the League of Nations we accept an element of international control in our armament arrangements, this is nothing new. There has always been such an element of control. The only difference is that the League would substitute orderly control for disorderly. The same thing holds of the only other arrangements it is proposed to subject to any measure of League control, international economic relations.

If we enter the League, we shall surrender the right to discriminate between one nation and the others, so long as all are members of the League in good standing. We shall not be free to apply one rate of duty to silks from Japan and another to silks from France. We shall not be free to permit Brazil to float loans in our financial markets while prohibiting the flotation of Argentinian loans, except for the protection of our own people in case of real differences in security offered. Well, what of it? Before the war we were free to discriminate as we chose, except in so far as we were bound by treaties which we could denounce at any time we pleased. But in fact our discriminations were very rare. As a rule we treated all alike and avoided tariff wars. That was the rule throughout Europe, in spite of the prevalent atmosphere of international hostility. All the nations granted each other most-favored nation treatment, because no other policy had proved workable. In exceptional cases, to be sure, one nation closed its markets to another, for purposes of coercion. Under the League no nation will be free to coerce another, but when any nation deserves coercion, it will be administered by the whole community of nations.

Under the League we shall have to surrender whatever national rights we claim to the coercion of other nations by either military or economic means. And when the League decrees that coercion of either kind must be applied to an offending nation, we shall have to take our part in applying it. But beyond this, we shall remain free to work out our own national destinies. If we want high tariffs or low tariffs or no tariffs at all, that will remain strictly our own national concern. If we want to build a great mercantile marine to carry our own goods, we shall remain free to encourage the shipbuilders in any manner we choose. No doubt under the League we shall endeavor to make equitable arrangements for common carriage on the seas, for international participation in the financing of development enterprise in backward regions, for the distribution of narrowly localized raw materials. League or no League, international arrangements of this kind will have to be made. They will be handled more efficiently under an international arrangement which will assure us that a nation we are trying to treat equitably in trade will not presently set out to cut our throats in war.

Under the League we shall do our best to make our own nation powerful in men and in material resources, sound and stable in its domestic policy and active in commerce throughout the world. This we shall owe to ourselves and to the League, whose strength will rise out of the power of its members. We shall expect the citizens of every other member nation to strive to advance their own national interests, likewise. The stronger and sounder our sister nations, the better for the League and for us. True, in neutral markets Americans will have to meet the competition of British and French and Italians, of Germans and Magyars. They will also have to meet the competition of other Americans. The distinction between national and international competition will signify nothing, if a permament international organization precludes the possibility that any group of traders may call upon the war powers of their nation to strengthen their trading position.

We are internationalists, in what we believe to be the only true and honest sense of the term. We believe in the expediency of creating a powerful international League upon the basis of powerful self-dependent, self-conscious nations. We are not proposing that any part of the national jurisdiction of any state shall be surrendered to the League. How the people of any state shall be governed, educated, protected against all the multitudinous chances within the scope of government, how their industry and commerce shall be regulated, are matters concerning the people of that state alone. But where, as in matters of war and armament and international economic relations, no nation can possibly live unto itself, but must necessarily adapt its policy to the policies of other nations, and must necessarily force other nations to adapt their policies to its own, we accept internationalism as a logical necessity. Where there is functional interna-

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tionalism, there should also be structural internationalism. The question is not at all one of nationalism versus internationalism but one of disorderly internationalism versus an orderly internationalism upon which every nation can base its calculations. Recognition of the international facts and the creation of institutions appropriate to the facts: that is what the League of Nations means, and nothing more.

Turkey's Approaching End

TURKEY, utterly defeated and on the verge of collapse, is about to submit. She expects no terms and will receive none. She will go into the Peace Conference without champions or friends and without a cause to plead. Five hundred years of misrule argue against her retention of any shred of authority over non-Turkish people. No imperialistic nation, not even Spain or Portugal, ever missed so utterly, so vast a chance of making a place for itself in the world. The Ottoman Empire is about to be dissolved because it has proved itself physically impotent and morally broken.

The astonishing fact, of course, is not that the Turk is at last going but that he has been able to delay his departure so long. At her very worst Turkey has always had entreating friends. In 1855 England and France protected her against Russia, and at Sebastopol British soldiers died in order that British soldiers might again die at Gallipoli and at Kut-el-Amara. In 1878 England and Austria once again came to Turkey's aid, tore up the treaty of San Stefano and restored the Balkan Christians to the slow-grinding Turkish exploitation. Then within the present generation Germany replaced England as Turkey's protector and dearest friend. The survival of the Turkish system, with its weakness, its violence, its bloodiness, has been rendered possible by the Balance of Power in Europe, first by an Anglo-Russian and later by an Anglo-German rivalry. The Sick Man of Europe did not need to cure himself, for his friends, who were mutually enemies, would keep him alive.

So for decade after decade the dead oppressive Turkish system held on. No European Power was willing to have Turkey go, "bag and baggage," if her expulsion meant that some rival Power would secure Constantinople. The Ottoman tyranny, it was believed, was inevitable and incurable. It was the price Europe paid for her own international anarchy.

Then ten years ago Turkey had her one chance to effect her own reformation. On July 24, 1908, a bloodless revolution overthrew the Red Sultan; the constitution of 1876 was restored and power in the state passed to a small group of enthusiastic revolutionists, the Young Turks. These successful Young Turks, who for years had been obscurely conspiring in Paris and Brussels, were now determined to modernize the crumbling Ottoman Empire. No longer should Turkey remain a land of police spies and official thieves. Ignorance, obscurantism and reaction were to be banished, schools established everywhere and the words Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, engraven on all public buildings and on mosques, churches and synagogues. A new Ottoman solidarity was to be created in which Mussulmen, Christians and Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Syrians and Bulgars were to lose their differences and become loyal fellow citizens. Turkey was to be an Ottoman Switzerland, a nation of many races ruled in the interest of all. In the fresh enthusiasm aroused by this ideal strangers kissed each other on the streets of Stamboul and Moslem *ulema* and Christian priests rode together through the streets in flower-strewn carriages and together exhorted the crowds in behalf of the new, democratic Ottoman Empire.

In a very few months the early optimism began to wane, and thereafter, year by year, the failure of the Revolution became more evident. The Young Turks, it soon appeared, were not of the stuff of which great moral revolutions are made. They soon learned to go the way of the Old Turks and it became apparent that these exotic reformers had changed Turkey less than Turkey had changed them. The Revolution was skin-deep. It was less vital, less mature, less real than had been hoped. It was more a change in the personnel of government than in its methods and spirit. The deterioration has been continuous. From July 1908 to October 1918 there has been a steady regression in ideals, an ever greater willingness to adopt the devices of Abdul Hamid, a growing indulgence in the tricks and shifts of policy, which in the past had kept the Sick Man of Europe alive—and sick.

The moral regeneration, without which Turkey could not live or deserve to live, simply failed to take place. It could hardly have been otherwise. This regeneration of Turkey was too huge a task for the untrained Young Turks, who possessed little administrative ability and little concrete knowledge. Undoubtedly they talked and wrote extremely well, but they possessed very little political realism and they found no real backing among the masses of the Turkish population, who though they detested Abdul Hamid, had little love for political iconoclasts who were not even good Mahometans. The Turkish peasant is an indus-

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trious, kindly, decent man, but he is almost invariably unlettered and is extraordinarily conservative. Among the educated Turks on the other hand were many who under the "Great Assassin" had thriven on official thievery, and desired its continuance. To run the government at all the more idealistic of the Young Turks were forced to come to an arrangement with pseudo-reformers who were far from idealistic. Finally—most tragic factor of all—the Young Turks, almost from the beginning, became imbued with a narrow and violent Turkish nationalism and allowed their movement to be identified with the policy of Turkifying the Ottoman Empire. Arabs, Armenians, Albanians and Bulgars were to be forcibly denationalized and converted into Turks.

It was of this policy, partly, it is true, forced upon the Young Turks by Germany and other European Powers, that the promising Turkish Revolution died. The Young Turks might possibly have won out, even against the enmity and false friendship of the western nations, if only they had been able to create a real federalism within the Ottoman Empire. It proved impossible. The Turks insisted on retaining full control of political power, and in due course their feverish nationalism awoke echoes among the subject races of Turkey. Because of their narrow and exaggerated nationalism the Young Turks increased the old hostility of Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs and Arabs. The Armenian situation became suddenly worse until it ended in wholesale assassination, the Macedonian conflict became embittered, and at last, after being despoiled by Austria and by Italy, the Ottoman Empire was thoroughly defeated in the first Balkan War and the greater part of her European territory was taken from Turkey. In four years the New Turks had met with nothing but failure, everywhere the new nationalistic jingoistic policy had broken down.

Finally, after all these swift-following disasters came the Great War. The Turkish nationalists, gamblers to the end, plunged in.

Perhaps this Turkish participation was unavoidable; perhaps Turkey would have been forced in had she not gone in willingly. In any event the Young Turkish leaders believed that Turkey was obliged to fight and to side with Germany. It was life or death. If Russia won the war, Constantinople would be lost; if Germany won, a reprieve, it was hoped, would be possible. Doubtless Germany would swallow Turkey ultimately but Russia would swallow her immediately.

The war has proved Turkey's final undoing. Though she won at Gallipoli and at Kut-el-Amara, the last two years have gone steadily against her. Egypt is lost, Arabia hostile, Palestine conquered, and Mesopotamia deeply invaded. The Holy War against the Infidel, which was to have shaken and perhaps shattered the British and French Empires with their huge Mahometan populations, has ignominiously failed; the call came a few centuries too late or perhaps a century too early. The prestige and morale of the Young Turks is gone and their ablest leaders have resigned. It is the end.

It is the end of Turkish nationalism, of Turkish imperialism, of the atrocious rule of the Turk in Europe from the conquering days of Mohammed the Second and Suleiman the Magnificent down to the present reign of the feeble Mohammed the Fifth. It is the end of all hope of regeneration of the Ottoman Empire from within. But it is not the end of the problem with which ten years ago the Young Turks were faced. The rich possessions of Turkey still remain; Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and the city of Constantinople. The problem of self-rule for the nations of Turkey and the problem of ruling these divers peoples in their own interest instead of in the selfish interest of one or another of the victors in this war, are still unsolved. Beyond all is the problem of Constantinople. Shall this city, which controls perhaps the most vital sea-route in the world, pass from Turkey's hands into the hands of some other one nation or shall this capital, together with the shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles, be internationalized and held in the interests of the whole world? All these problems now pass from the febrile nationalism of the Young Turk to the thoughtful consideration of statesmen to whom conceptions of a peace based upon equity and upon a stable international system are not wholly foreign.

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The Hungarian "Chaos"

THE bewilderment with which the news of the Hungarian "declaration of independence" was received by many Americans is by no means an accident. Even in the fifth year of the war, Americans are apt to entertain rather hazy ideas about the Hungarian sphere itself, and it would not be far from the truth to say that this bewilderment was, in a way, one of the primary objects of the astute tacticians of the Budapest parliament. For more than one reason the manoeuvre was launched simultaneously with the Czecho-Slovak declaration of independence, issued by Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik, and the uncannily well-timed hoisting of the Czecho-Slovak flag at Prague. The inference is obvious that, whilst on the one hand the Magyar junker oligarchy was anxious to cut itself free from the foundering Austrian state, and to reinforce the barrier separating the eighteen Slovak counties from a Bohemia coming into her own, on the other hand it counted on a supposed American sentimental weakness for "declarations of independence." The theatrical effect was too shallow and easy of detection to alter American and Allied policy in the long run, but it was clearly calculated to swerve the balance at the crucial moment and it might have resulted in a temporary advantage to be followed up with swift manipulations of slogans about democracy and autonomy and other presumably anti-German pronouncements.

That these calculations succeeded only to a slight extent, mostly in the way of begetting a few misleading headlines and some uncertain editorial comment, is due, above all, to President Wilson's reply to Austria-Hungary. A masterpiece of political strategy in all respects, not the least in its timing, it is destined to crush whatever hopes for survival there remained in Austro-Magyar junker statesmen. The President's note pronounces sentence of death upon the Hapsburgs and all they stand for—that sentence so eagerly awaited by most liberals in Allied countries ever since the outcome of the Prince Sixtus incident showed that all hopes for a "regenerate" Hapsburgism were utterly futile.

An analysis of the difference between what the so-called Hungarian declaration of independence pretends to be, and what it really is, leads to the fundamental issue of Magyar politics in the last half century, the issue of Magyar racial supremacy.

To sum up briefly, the declaration of independence issued, according to the press despatches, by the Budapest pseudo-parliament, tries to persuade the world that the Hungarian nation is sick of the war and of the German-Austrian alliance, and turns to America and the Allies for guidance and support, asking nothing but the guaranty of its independent statehood.

Now the real danger of this move lies in the element of truth behind it. Not even the fiercest antagonists of the Magyar race will care to deny that the Magyar people is tired of the war and has come to loathe its Prussian taskmasters. It is extremely likely that Hungary is recognizing in breathless haste that it can be saved from utter ruin only by the good will of the Allies.

But, starting from this premise, the Magyar junker statesmen do not proceed to tell the world that they are at last ready to take their dose. They do not promise to comply with the demands of President Wilson by freeing absolutely and unconditionally the oppressed races of Hungary and by leaving the restricted but regenerated Magyar people to take care of its own destiny. What they do say amounts in reality to this:

"Germany is hopelessly beaten. The disintegration of Austria is advancing rapidly. The dual system, the basis of our misrule for the last half century, has exploded. The Magyar masses are clamoring for peace. The French are pushing dangerously northward in Serbia. We are confronted with the double task of satisfying the Magyar masses and buying off the good will of the Allies. We mean to do both by declaring Hungarian independence.

"For home consumption we'll call it shaking off the Austrian yoke; for foreign circulation, abandoning the Teutonic alliance. To the Allies we offer a peace which destroys the last remaining possibilities of a Mitteleuropa—for which, by the way, we do not care much, as it implies a strengthened German and Bulgarian agrarian competition. All we ask in exchange is a chance to deal with the restive Slovaks and Rumanians and Serbo-Croats. To the Magyar people we offer the realization of its age-long dream—separation from Austria. By pointing out that this is *our* achievement we shall secure their support for continuing the old-fashioned game of oppressing and exploiting and dragooning the Slavs and Rumanians, not to speak of the Magyar peasantry. As, however, this is an age of world democracy, we'll call the thing suffrage reform and autonomy and self-determination of peoples. Whatever happens, we are firm in our purpose to uphold Magyar supremacy—as we understand it."

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This is what the so-called Hungarian declaration of independence, played up in big headlines by the still pro-German Magyar newspapers in this country, really means. It means that instead of Count Apponyi following the lead of Count Tisza, as in August 1914, Count Tisza will follow the lead of Count Apponyi. It means—to introduce the two basic catchwords of Hungarian junker politics—that the banner of '67 has been hauled down, and the banner of '48 hoisted on the citadel of racial and political oppression and economic exploitation called the Hungarian national state. But the citadel remains the same—until the shells of Allied guns from without and the unfettered rage of the Magyar people from within shall shatter it to dust.

What do these two "basic catchwords" of Hungarian politics stand for? They represent the Hungarian variation of the two-party system, a manifoldly vitiated and distorted version of the English original. "Sixty-seven" stands for the Ausgleich of 1867, or the dualistic system providing for a close union with Austria in matters of diplomacy and armaments, and, to a certain extent, finances and commerce. "Forty-eight" points to the fundamental law of 1848 under which the union with Austria was limited to the common person of the sovereign, with full independence in all other matters and complete separation as ultimate ideal.

These doctrines are apparently opposed. In point of fact, they cover an issue only so far as the means and methods, but not the substantial purpose of government, are concerned. The substantial purpose is identical in either case—to perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the Magyar peasantry and working class and of the non-Magyar races by a corrupt junker oligarchy. The best proof of this can be found in the personnel of the two parties, or rather fundamental groups. Both are recruited from among the same limited number of noble land-holding families and the representatives of the "gentry," which during the last half century has changed from a class of medium-size estate owners into a landless but influential county bureaucracy. These two classes, with a generous sprinkling of wealthy Jewish commercials and opportunist lawyers, furnish the membership of both great party groups. They compose ninety-five per cent of the Hungarian parliament. With a common training and tradition, common class interest, common hatred of democracy in the Wilsonian sense of the term, both parties are junker, oligarchic, anti-European to the core. The difference of slogans covers only a difference of method, not of principle.

The "Liberals," or, as they were rechristened in the last decade, the "Party of National Labor" (both names adopted on the pattern of lucus a non lucendo), were the adherents of the Compromise of 1867. They upheld dualism because they recognized that the German-Magyar combination, supported from the outside by a close military alliance with Prussia, was the safest bulwark of junker domination.

On the other hand, the old irreconcilables of the various "Independence and '48" parties saw in the close-knit economic and military relations with Austria danger to Magyar interests and a humiliation for Magyar chauvinistic pride. They insisted upon various degrees of separation partly from motives of tradition and sentiment, partly—especially in latter days—for fear of the undesirable influence of Austrian universal suffrage, the growing attraction of the Czechs for the Slovaks, and the increasing consciousness of Jugo-slav unity.

The favorite camouflage used by the partisans of the '67 principle was Whig liberalism; that of the Independence politicians, democratic nationalism—the democratic ingredient thickening and thinning as the hopes of the group sank and rose, and completely disappearing when, in 1905, the so-called coalition acquired a short but ill-used lease of power for the forces of '48.

Similarly, the pet bogey of the liberals was the pan-Slav menace and Russian imperialism. It used this bogey to extort increased armaments. The spectre profitably employed by their opponents was Austrian "federalism" and the centralism of Joseph II days.

But with all these slogans and tricks and bogeys the fundamental unity of purpose of both groups was manifested by their identical attitude toward the nationalities—hateful oppression and exploitation tempered by occasional attempts at bribery, and toward the Magyar socialists, industrial and agrarian: persecution and chicanery tempered by nothing.

These, in brief, are the historical antecedents of two main parties of the Hungarian oligarchy. At the outbreak of the war they were brought together by the common hatred and common hopes of plunder, and they are now united again by defeat and the common dread of destruction. But for the Magyar radical, the Magyar socialist, the oppressed and exploited Magyar masses, it matters little whether the system under which they suffer is called dualism or independence; for the oppressed and exploited Slovaks and Rumanians and Serbo-Croats it matters less. A solution which will leave Magyar junkerdom, whatever its label, in or near the seat of power, will mean for the Tiszas and Apponyis an increased prestige and for the democratic forces in Hungary a multiplied handicap.

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For the Magyar masses the sacrifices and sufferings of this war will bear fruit only if the Wekerles and Apponyis are thrown into the discard together with the Tiszas and Burians. Anything short of that will be a defeat for the Allies and a defeat for the Magyar people, and a menace to the future safety of Europe. The states to be erected in the stead of the present Hapsburg empire cannot live half junker and half free. A free Czecho-Slovak republic will want for its neighbor a Hungary purged of her tyrants and slavedrivers.

For the Hungarian problem—as for the German—there is only one solution: unconditional surrender of the junkers. Unconditional surrender, not the kind Senator Lodge is brandishing as a sinister phrase, but the one President Wilson is relentlessly exacting as a beneficial fact.

EUGENE S. BAGGER.

The Land Settlement Community

IN earlier articles I have invited attention to the growing movement for community land settlement and have dealt with the political preconditions and the economic possibilities of such settlements. There is room for them not merely on reclaimed waste lands but in practically every state of the union. They can be made to pay. But in handling them with the brevity imposed upon me by the limitations of space, I have probably given an impression of a dull uniformity not only within each community but running from community to community throughout the country. At all events I may not unfairly be accused of having viewed the community development from the outside. But it is the inside that signifies. How would life, with all its heterogeneity and restlessness, run its course within such communities? That is a question which demands at least a tentative answer.

The fundamental element in the proposed community system is the one family farm home. For this element there ought to be a certain uniformity. There should be a substantial and convenient house, well adequate to the needs of a family not too limited, for in the future as in the past we shall depend on the country to maintain our population balance against the unfavorable influences of an ever-increasing urban development. To the house must be attached such a unit of land and improvements as, worked competently by the settler with hired help only in time of stress, will produce a satisfactory family maintenance. And that means at least as good a maintenance as the skilled artisan or industrial worker can command. In this calculation I am taking into account labor income proper, or the surplus above the rental or single tax value of the land and interest on the money sunk in improvements. The settler who has paid for his land is entitled to a return on its capital value in addition to his labor income. And of course the settler who works his holding with more than good average skill will make a profit, to which he is most properly entitled.

The plan therefore assumes good workman's wages together with a modest opportunity for thrift and the profits of unusual skill. It frowns upon aggregation of holdings and subdivision of holdings. There is no room in it for the kind of ambition that lays field to field in an endeavor to constitute a landed estate. Nor is there any room in it for the man who wishes to take the profits of his life in the form of ease and contemplation. I recognize that the world has need of both types. But the man who wants to make a fortune had best leave agriculture alone. His opportunity lies elsewhere, just as does the opportunity of the man who wants to make pictures or statues, set broken bones or plead cases at court. So also the contemplative soul may be expected to find himself a place in the sun without immobilizing a section of the good rich earth from which we must all get our bread.

While the type element in the proposed settlement community is conceived in terms of economic uniformity, there would be no physical uniformity within the community, or from community to community. Except in the rare cases where all the land is alike, the holdings in each community will vary in size inversely with the productivity of the land. This involves a nice calculation at the time when the community is laid out, and it necessarily admits of a margin of error. In the settlement at Durham, California, the type holdings are only approximately equal. But unavoidable inequalities can be ironed out, as at Durham, by the payments exacted. And such inequalities as may result from future price movements or changes in technique can be taken care of through voluntary arrangements for redistribution of holdings under the consent of the community.

Again, the typical holding will vary widely in acreage from one section of the country to another. Where general economic conditions prescribe fruit growing or market gardening, a much smaller acreage would be required than in regions where the growing of cereals and stock raising are alone profitable.

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The point where this settlement plan appears most open to attack on grounds of excessive uniformity is in the personal qualifications it implies. Only those who can give evidence of thrift and a reasonable mastery of agricultural technique could be considered at all as candidates for holdings. Beyond these qualifications we should add, in behalf of the community, general acceptability as determined by representatives of settlers already chosen, and, in behalf of the state, literacy and American citizenship. The qualification of general acceptability to the community is defensible on the ground that selective social and business relations are not practicable in the rural community, as they are in the city. All the children must go to the same school; all the adult settlers must cooperate; all the families must be able to join in amusements and entertainment if life is not to be unspeakably dull. A sprinkling of trouble makers or incorrigible grumblers will ruin the social life of any rural community. Therefore the community should have the means of protecting itself against their admission. As for the qualifications of American citizenship and literacy, there is abundant reason for their imposition. We have in America rural communities in which illiteracy persists generation after generation, and other communities in which alien speech and alien manners have been transmitted from parents to children for above a century. Such communities are almost impenetrable to the forces of Americanism. They are admittedly an element of weakness in our national life, and if we are to work toward a more efficacious nationalism, we must see that the agricultural communities of the future are soundly American to the core.

But what provision are we making for the multitude of men who may desire to return to the soil but who have not the technical, physical, political or intellectual qualifications fixed for the typical farm holder? These rural communities can not be made to consist exclusively of typical farm holders. Other elements must enter into the community life, and this fact insures a more or less elastic domain within which other needs than those of the able-bodied, competent farmer may satisfactorily be met.

While it is contemplated that the farmer himself, with the aid of the members of his own family, will ordinarily perform all the work on his holding, yet there will be occasions when he will need hired labor. The community as a whole, by proper planning of operations, will be able to offer fairly steady work to several laborers, although each member has only occasional need for hired service. The Australian settlement communities, and, following their example, the California settlement at Durham, have made provision for laborers' cottages and gardens. Here the man whose ambitions or abilities would not otherwise place him above the condition of the farm hand, may enjoy what the farm hand does not, a home of his own, with the opportunity of working for himself when his services are not required elsewhere, and the independent status that attaches to the man who is drawn in from the outside to work for day's wages, and whose value is measured day by day by the money that must be paid out to get his help. As farm laborer in such a community, a man who had not at first the essential qualifications of Americanism or agricultural technique might attain them if he desired. As with the status of farm hand in the old-fashioned American farming district, the status of laborer in the settlement community ought to be transitional, as a rule. But there would always be individuals incapable of the systematic effort to rise out of it. Nevertheless, their children would enjoy the opportunities of the educational and cooperative life of a soundly American community. Democracy would therefore take no damage even from a fairly permanent class of laborers.

In addition to the services of day laborers, other auxiliary services would be required by the single community or by groups of communities. Education would have to be better provided for than in the rural district of today, and ought to extend to technical agricultural education for children who expect to remain on the land. With cooperative institutions properly organized, there would be room for the services of persons to manage the operations of marketing and purchasing. It would be desirable to have in the community men competent to perform the mechanical work that is continually emerging in country life—carpentry and plastering, blacksmithing and the like. All this points to a number of untypical holdings, affording homes and gardens for men who expect to earn most of their livelihood by working for wages.

And beyond this, the life of the community might be further varied and enriched by provision for untypical holdings for men incapacitated for full work by industrial accident or occupational disease, or, above all, by mutilation in war. Much of the work about a small farm can be conducted by a one-armed or one-legged man. Provided that hired labor is available on special occasion, even a high degree of physical disability is not fatal to modest success in many forms of agriculture. Mothers of children orphaned by war industry might also find their misfortunes mitigated if established on small holdings in such communities.

But what of the mentally subnormal, the half-witted, the congenital ne'er do wells who flourish so disastrously in many backwater rural districts

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of the present day? Should we find a place for them? No. Whatever may be their final disposition, we can not afford to permit our organized rural communities to be disfigured by their presence. What we are aiming at is an agricultural system based upon sound economics, sound politics, sound physiology and psychology. Agriculture is the foundation of the state. To vitiate it with degeneracy is to endanger the whole political and social structure.

With this reservation, that all elements admitted to the settlement community must be mentally and morally sound, the greater the variety of non-typical holdings the better. It should be the object of the state to weave into the straight warp of typical farming households the richest possible woof of other social elements that would benefit from open-air democracy. There are circumstances in which the settlement community might be more largely industrial than agricultural. There are other circumstances in which it might even serve chiefly as a place of convalescence for those whose health has been shattered by the strain of urban industrialism. We can set no definite limits to the variety that may be produced if individual and local, state and federal forces cooperate intelligently in re-creating rural community life.

But I may seem to run the risk of giving too free rein to the imagination, as in my earlier economic analysis I might have been accused of holding it too much in check. So much, however, one may maintain with conviction untinged by sentiment: the settlement community offers a solution of the problem of agrarian democracy, a very large factor in the general problem of economic democracy. And in solving this agrarian problem the state would place itself in a position to contribute materially to the solution of many of the problems of the displaced and handicapped among its citizens.

ALVIN JOHNSON.

A Year of Bolshevism

TWELVE months ago the Bolsheviki seized the power of the state, proclaimed Russia a socialistic republic, and started the civil war. With all its horrors, that is a most momentous anniversary and future history will no doubt study every detail of the tremendous social upheaval in Russia for the past year. But today we must not attempt anything of the character of an historical survey of the civil war in Russia. Not only is impartial judgment impossible at this juncture, but we are today engrossed in other more actual problems. We must approach the social cataclysm in Russia not as historians but as publicists and statesmen.

But before approaching the civil war now raging in Russia from any point of view, historical or otherwise, I feel the need of explaining my position. The Bolsheviki, Bolshevism and their terrorism are so hated and cursed by everybody that the very idea of speaking seriously of them, no matter whether one is going to condemn them or not, is considered if not a crime at least an indecency. The Bolsheviki are traitors to Russia, to the Allied cause and to Socialism, and that is the end of it. You may repeat day after day that they are outlaws, scoundrels, thieves, paid agents of the German government, or valets of German militarism, and you will be welcomed. But to write about the Bolshevik revolution as a social upheaval, about the terrorism in Russia as civil war and the confiscation of land and of property as a social phenomenon, is considered a public scandal.

I am therefore under no illusion that my attempt to reveal the real character of the conflict raging now in Russia will fail to bring upon me the wrath of many good citizens. If, notwithstanding such serious consequences, I still persist in my appeals to apply statesmanship to the Russian situation, I am anxious to remove the false impression that I am playing heroics. I should not dare to come into conflict with the powerful opinion of the man-in-the-street if it were not for my deep conviction that in order to defeat Bolshevism it is necessary to know its exact nature, its origin and how it developed.

The Bolsheviki claim that they are fulfilling a great constructive programme—the establishment of a new social order—and they really are accomplishing many positive ends. Many things which they have introduced into Russia's economic and social life are highly significant. The principles of equality and self-reliance which they have helped to awaken in Russia are great and positive achievements. Only blind men who refuse to see could deny the many creative and positive elements in the Bolshevik programme and in their activities. And yet Bolshevism is not a creative nor a positive force. The real origin of Bolshevism is desperation and its true nature is pessimism.

When the revolution first started there were very few Bolsheviki. In the Petrograd Soviet the Bolsheviki, with the Left Social Revolutionists and the Anarchists, together had less than 100 out of 2,000 members. Lenine, who was given the

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most enthusiastic reception when first he arrived in Petrograd, was so much out of touch with the sentiments and aspirations of the masses at that time that he seldom came down to the Soviet meetings, and he and his followers could not even get a fair hearing. There was hope in Russia at that time and Bolshevism did not appeal to the people. The situation was exceedingly grave, and yet Russia was optimistic to the extreme. Russian territory was invaded by the enemy, Russia's army was in a process of rapid dissolution, industrial exhaustion prevailed, the country was ruined and the state finances were in a state of chaos. But hope prevailed and the germ of Bolshevism could not penetrate into the masses of the Russian people.

The most significant and striking phenomenon after the Revolution was the tranquillity of the peasants, the absence of agrarian riots and violation of property, which always heretofore accompanied every upheaval of the peasants in Russia. And why? Because there was optimism. The peasants believed in the sincerity of the promises given by the landowners in the Duma and the Provisional Government to solve the land question. And they abstained from a repetition of the agrarian riots and wanton destruction traditional in Russia during peasant uprisings.

The period of agrarian riots and terrible destruction of life and property began at a later stage when the germ of pessimism and disappointment penetrated deep into the peasant masses. The signal for Bolshevik action in the villages was given by the Provisional Government, which overthrew the new agrarian law presented by Chernoff, the Socialist agrarian minister. The landowners and bourgeois elements in the government were so embittered by the radicalism of Chernoff's agrarian reform that they did not abstain even from splitting the government.

Prince Lvoff, who was the Premier, quit the government purposely to defeat Chernoff's project, and Chernoff himself was obliged also to quit the government because a campaign was started in the Cadet press denouncing him as a paid agent of Germany. (In his case no "documents" have been necessary. Being a Cabinet Minister in a "bourgeois government," it was sufficient for the press to give prominence to "gossip." Chernoff promptly resigned his position to have freedom to rehabilitate himself. The campaign in the press then ceased immediately and the charges were explained away.) The landowners scored a victory and the peasants answered with violation, riots, destruction of estates and wilful land seizures.

That was the way Bolshevism "triumphed" all over the country, in towns as well as in villages. Pessimism and desperation, not any positive impulse, stimulated the growth of Bolshevism. Bolshevism is the mental reaction of a desperate and starving people who try to forget their sufferings by the vision of a great ideal. If that only had been conceived by people who have been dealing with the Russian situation, the "triumph" of Bolshevism certainly would have been frustrated. At least its nourishment could have been taken away. It is obvious that the only remedy was to ameliorate the economic situation and to help the starving population. To allow the people real, though limited, happiness *at once* would have satisfied them more than the dreams of an unlimited happiness in the future. But that was indeed a queer statesmanship which supported counter-revolution in Russia with its flat and contemptuous rejection of all ideals cherished by the people and its demand instead for the continuation of the war, which spelled exhaustion and ruin to the country.

It is often said that the Bolsheviki "bribed" the peasants by *giving* them the land. In matter of fact, the peasants did not wait until the Bolsheviki "gave" the land. They took it when they despaired of getting it from the Provisional Government. But it is sheer madness to believe that it is possible to "bribe" the peasants by *taking away* the land *from them*. If the Bolsheviki have bribed the people by making peace, it is impossible to bribe them by inducing them to make war. If the people were bribed by the demobilization of the army, it is hard to believe it possible to bribe them by ordering a new mobilization.

The continuation of the Bolsheviki in power for such a long period has often been represented as the greatest puzzle of the revolution, concerning which many very contradictory theories have been elaborated. I venture to suggest that the only explanation lies in the absence of statesmanship on the part of their opponents.

The Russian peasants have never been interested in politics. The only thing which made them interested in politics was the land question. After they got the land they were likely to become the most conservative element in Russia. The peasants certainly had a feeling of gratitude to the Bolsheviki for solving the land question, but opposition to Bolshevism was bound to grow among them because they needed internal peace to consolidate their economic gains. Unfortunately, all the attempts to overthrow Bolshevism were permeated by counter-revolutionary aspirations, led by landowners and aimed at the restoration of landed property.

Is it any wonder then that the peasants readily

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answered the call of the Bolsheviki to fight the Rada and the Cossacks? The peasants as a class are by no means Bolshevik, but they certainly will support anybody who will fight for the land and oppose any force which aims at the restoration of the land to the former landowners.

Nothing is more natural than the desperate fight of the landowners for the land which they have always considered their sacred ownership. They at any rate are justified in all they do to defeat the revolution and to restore former titles to land. "Their" Russia is destroyed; why should they display especial tenderness towards the "poor man's Russia"? And, being themselves powerless, they are knocking at every door, seeking military help. Those of them who are nearer Germany are imploring German militarism to save Russia and Europe from anarchy and chaos; those who have no access to Germany have to be satisfied with the more limited and less promising assistance of the Allies.

That Germany is ready to help the Russian imperialists and landowners is only too obvious. The more trouble in Russia, the more Russia is weakened by civil war, the more benefits Germany derives. The "assistance" she has given to the Finnish reactionaries has made Finland a German province, temporarily at least; the "help" she has given to the Rada has brought the Ukraine under the German control. The "aid" to General Krasnoff has added the rich Don province to the German dominions, and "friendliness" towards the Georgian Republic has brought them the "gratitude" of the Caucasus.

But that the Russian imperialists and landowners have succeeded in enlisting the assistance of the Allies is bewildering and grotesque. The interest, aspirations and ideals of the Allies are identical with those of democratic Russia. They would like to see Russia united, free and independent, but the foundation of a free, independent and wealthy Russia is only to be secured by the stilling of the land hunger of the peasants. The Allies would like to see order established in Russia, but order will not be established until the peasants return to work, and they will not be able to do so as long as their land possession is endangered.

The Russians who invited and implored the Allies to intervene in Russia based their appeals on many things. They first tempted the Allies with the possibility of a new eastern front and a new Russian army to oppose the Germans. Then they appealed to the humanitarian sentiments of the Allies, holding before them the ideal of saving Russia from the Red Terror. They also tried to enlist the support of the French capitalists by promising to pay the Russian state debts. In short, they made every illusory and tempting promise, and were only silent about their main and only idea, which was to restore the land to the landowners. And when the Allies, tempted by all these illusory promises, helped them to reestablish their authority in some places, the first thing they did was to declare all the decrees of the Bolshevik government (the land decree included) null and void. And the Bolshevik regime, which on all accounts was nearing its end, received new impetus and new support from the peasants.

Bolshevism is pessimism and desperation. The more pessimism and despondency, the more sumptuous is the growth of Bolshevism. And, not only does Bolshevism become more widespread under the impulse of a desperate situation, but at the same time it grows more extreme, violent and wild. A few months ago, when the menace of a Cossack counter-revolution was defeated, the Bolsheviki were losing a considerable support among the peasants.

It is very significant that the Bolshevik victory, contrary to expectations, led to a moderation of their views; they actually shifted to a much more moderate and realistic programme. Lenine advocated with great force and persuasion the necessity of stopping the "Red Guard attacks upon capitalism," preached the doctrine of a rigid self-control and other "bourgeois virtues" among the workers, and manifested a genuine statesmanship in proclaiming the inevitableness of the stage of state capitalism as a prelude to socialism. The Bolsheviki at that time were permeated by the spirit of reconciliation and tried to enlist the intellectuals and the experts of industry and management. They even reconciled themselves with the officers of the old imperial army.

Only since the Czecho-Slovaks seized the Siberian Railway and cut off Central Russia from the Volga provinces and Siberia—which considerably intensified the food shortage—has Bolshevism spread further and further and assumed a more violent attitude.

So far, Bolshevism has defeated its opponents solely through the disintegration of their forces. To defeat Bolshevism by military efforts is impossible; military action exhausts the country more, makes the people more desperate, and, even if successful, would stimulate a greater growth of Bolshevism.

The only sure way to defeat Bolshevism is to disintegrate its forces, to remove its sources of existence. Only when civil war is ended and the peasants are assured of their lands, only then will Bolshevism begin to disappear.

MICHAEL S. FARBMAN.

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Who Fell with Charles?

LONG live the Austrian people! Long live the Magyar peasant! They are our enemies. But long may they live, now! For Austria-Hungary is fallen. And there may be a little Bolshevism. And a few houses of great noblemen may be sacked. Too bad. But what were those houses? And what, in fact, after all, was Austria-Hungary?

We say autocracy; and we say race-hatred, race-dominance, the oppressing of good races by bad races. But nobody believes, even to himself, that the Hapsburg family walked up and down from Trieste to Cracow knocking forty million people personally by the head. And nobody believes that the Austrian zinc-etcher at his pots and pans in a printing establishment in Vienna and the Magyar reaper of wheat in the meadows of the valley of the Theiss spent any of their time oppressing Father Korosec of Slovenia or Professor Masaryk of Prague.

Austria-Hungary, like every other undemocratic political institution, had more than a political purpose. Autocracy was a lever. Race-hatred was a fulcrum. The thing raised was money. Coin.

Estates. Great estates. Owned by Germans and by Magyars and by Germanized and Magyarized fellow-noblemen. Estates extending far out beyond the confines of real Austria and of real Hungary into foreign lands, Slav lands, Rumanian lands, conquered and annexed. Estates peopled solidly by Slavs and by Rumanians. Rent. And then, at home, in Vienna and in Buda-Pest, new bankers and new manufacturers. New investments. Interest. Rent and interest. And then:

"You German artisan and German merchant! You Magyar peasant and Magyar tradesman! You see those Slavs? They hate us. They hate us Germans and Magyars. They say so. They admit it. Jealous people! Lazy people! Tricky people! Much like the Irish. But leave them to us. Strong government! And behold our good Emperor and King! He is on our side. Forward! Germanism! Magyarism!"

The poor got the ism. The rich got the ism and the rent. And both got corrupted and brutalized. How can the Slavs compromise with the memory of it? How can they take autonomy? They have seen autonomy.

For fifty years Croatia has had autonomy. For fifty years Croatia has had an autonomous legislature. And for fifty years Croatia has had legislative candidates in prison, legislative voters governmentally bribed and governmentally flogged, the autonomous legislature prorogued and autocratic viceroys reigning with troops. For fifty years Croatia has had a foretaste every year of the sort of Austro-Hungarian general who with his own hand has signed the death-warrants of more than five thousand Slav civilians during the war and of the sort of Austro-Hungarian governor who has forced whole villages of Serbs to stand in long lines and to dig the long trenches into which, men and women and children tangled together, they tumbled dead.

And all because of those houses, those houses of nice noblemen, those centres and symbols of the cunningest and vilest of all contrived cunning and vile devices for making numerous races of men in God's image hate other numerous races of men in God's image and keep the few fastened fat on the backs of the many.

The Bolsheviki, according to the newspaper, have engineered massacres for Utopia. These nice noblemen engineered massacres for rent.

They are fallen. When we go to Prague after the war and look out into the Bohemian countryside, what shall we see? We shall see what the Czecho-Slovak National Council, in its Declaration of Bohemian Independence, tells us we shall see. We shall see:

"The redeeming of the large estates for home colonization."

That is among the first things the Czecho-Slovak National Council thinks of. The German and Germanized feudal landlords will pass.

And what will happen to him back home in Austria itself and in Hungary itself? Apponyi, Andrassy, you Castor and Pollux of liberal lying on the Hungarian plain, always for liberalism on the Potomac, always against it on the Danube, what are you going to say to the Magyar peasant now?

It is clear what he will say to you. Right across the frontier from him, right over his back-lot fence, he sees that once base Slovak peasant with a vote now and a farm now of his own and no nobleman. If for him, why not for me? That is what he will be saying to you. What will you say to him? You used to say Magyarism. Now you will say land. Now you will talk reality.

Just one thing might save you. Suppose you could persuade your peasant that the new Czecho-Slovak state was dangerous to him! Suppose you could persuade him that Professor Masaryk, President Masaryk, was about to conquer Hungary. Then you might possibly keep your peasant tame.

Henry Cabot Lodge will do his best to help you. He hates you, most genuinely, but he will do his best to help you. League of Nations? Treaties with and for "enemies"? "Internationalism"? Very dangerous. Must be approached with great caution. Just one thing certain. Death to "enemies"! Czecho-Slovakia is a friend. Hungary

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is an enemy. Death, and more death, to enemies!

Apponyi, Andrassy, Wekerle, Tisza, there stands your friend! Race-danger. Race-suspicion. Race-hatred. The very stuff of which your houses stand built!

But he will not prevail. The Slavs themselves, your victims, meeting at Philadelphia, and speaking for all the Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary, have spoken for an immediate and impartial League of Nations.

We will guarantee Hungary, just exactly as we will guarantee Czecho-Slovakia, against the aggressor and spoiler. We will guarantee our enemies just exactly as we will guarantee our friends. We will bring it about that the Magyar peasant shall know that he is safe from the Slovak peasant. And then you will not be safe from the Magyar peasant. Then you, in Hungary itself, will begin to see "the redeeming of large estates for home colonization."

And at Vienna! At Vienna indeed there will be a voice of wrath, remorseless wrath, the wrath of dupes disillusioned. From the German merchant and the German artisan this voice will rise to say to the German great feudalist and to the German great capitalist:

"Who destroyed our revolutionary liberalism of 1848? You. Who called in the Slavs of the south to help destroy it? You. Who turned against the Slavs and called on us to unite against them in the Reichsrat? You. Who made this war and put us down and put the Slavs up? You. And now, with no Slavs in the Reichsrat, with only Germans there now, who is it we will vote against there now? You!"

The flood-gates are open. The most intricate dam ever built to stop the free flow of the genuine conflicts between human beings as human beings is broken. The most ingenious petrifaction of race-hatred for class-gain ever attempted is flowing in wreckage down the stream. And if among the hands that shattered it were the hands of Mr. Lodge and Lord Curzon, the boats that will be soon going triumphant down the new released waters will fly the flags of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Henderson.

W. H.

Edward Kidder Graham

EDWARD KIDDER GRAHAM, president of the University of North Carolina since 1914, a prominent leader in state, southern and national educational affairs, died at his home in Chapel Hill on Saturday, October 26th, from influenza. Since his election to the presidency of the university in June, 1914, President Graham has impressed himself upon the thought of the nation as an unusually strong progressive leader. He has built upon the foundation laid in the South by educational pioneers like the late Dr. McIver, the late Chancellor Hill, and President Alderman, of the University of Virginia, and in the brief period of his presiding has focussed attention on an educational policy whose purpose was service to all the people. The character of this service has been widely varied. It has included night schools for the Negroes of the local village, correspondence courses for workers back home, summer school courses for teachers in the public schools, rural life conferences for those interested in the improvement of rural conditions, and road institutes for the building of a permanent system of county and state highways. Package libraries, a series of extension bulletins intended to convert the state into one great society for the study and discussion of civic problems, and state wide debate contest for 1,000 or more debaters, and 100,000 hearers annually in the North Carolina high schools have been outstanding in the programme. This service has been so significant that it has recently been made the subject of a special bulletin of the United States Bureau of Education entitled the Bureau of Extension of the University of North Carolina. Before the entry of America into the war, President Graham immediately recognized the duty of acquainting his state with the aims and ideals of America. This he did through a series of war papers which attracted wide attention, the underlying idea of which was in complete harmony with the present war issues course now being used in the Students' Army Training Corps units. His qualities as a director in all fields of educational endeavor had been constantly sought, and at the time of his death he was serving as regional director of the Students' Army Training Corps of the South Atlantic States, as trustee of the American University in Europe, as a member of the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A., and as a member of the Educational Committee of the Council of National Defense. In speaking of him, Secretary Daniels said: "I think he was the most useful man in North Carolina, and we would spare any man in the state rather than him. He was a man of clear vision, had the confidence of the entire state, and was truly representative of the best spirit of North Carolina. He bore not only a state but a national reputation as an educator, counsellor and great citizen. I deeply deplore his death, which means an irreparable loss to the educational systems of my state and to the country as a whole."

LOUIS R. WILSON.

To F. F.

Part of your life lies buried in France—
The part, you know, that used to dance
And shout like a child up the morning hill,
And pound at the doors of Heaven, until
A glint of its golden-rose came through,
Transfiguring the things you do,
Making them bold and gallant and gay—
High adventures for every day!

But now, like a creature wrested free
From a hidden trap, you have come to be
Always nursing an inner pain;
You will never climb the hill again,
Pounding your fists upon Heaven's door—
Snatching at radiance—never more!
The part, you know, that used to dance
Part of your life lies buried in France.

ETHEL HOBART.

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The Progress of the Allies

(*Special Cable from Our London Correspondent*)

WILSON'S reply has given general satisfaction here, and should the enemy decide to go on with negotiations there is every prospect that we may meet him with a united political front. To that the mission of Colonel House will greatly contribute. The only two difficulties in Wilson's Fourteen Points are the freedom of the seas and the future of Turkey. After England's immense sacrifices for freedom, it is necessary to convince her that the abolition of a commercial blockade will not impair the power of the navy to strike blows for the world's freedom, and in the interest of our friendship it is desirable that American comment should insist on the advantages to an island Power of the increase in security this reform would bring. We on our side must convince you of the true grandeur of our emancipating movement in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia, and that there is no reason to distrust the old imperialist spirit. As Balfour said, we are imperialists, but not imperialistic.

Wilson's formula that an armistice must make it impossible for Germany to continue the war hits the nail on the head. Once an armistice is concluded, it will probably be impossible to get Germany or France to fight again, but it will make a tremendous difference in argumentation at the Conference how much either side holds. Germany's idea is to conduct a dilatory evacuation of France and Belgium, so that when a crisis is reached in negotiations she may be not on her own frontiers, but on the Meuse line. In that case she would have something to bargain with. But we want no bargaining, only justice, therefore the armistice terms must contain in embryo the future terms of peace.

Military demands are probably less exacting than civilian, but the minimum would appear to be evacuation of all occupied territory before negotiations begin, and surrender of Metz, Strassburg and Colmar in Alsace-Lorraine. This would not be unconditional surrender, but would enable argument at the Conference to rest entirely on grounds of justice and not of material force. It cannot be too clearly understood that the impulse to armistice overtures came from the military party in Germany. In opposition to Ludendorff a strong minority of the General Staff long wished to retreat to the Meuse line and after the failure of the German offensive this spring this party gained the upper hand.

It would have been more convenient for the Allies to defer the offensive till next spring, but an immediate offensive became necessary in view of the German preparations for retreat. Otherwise, the almost unmolested retreat of 1916 would have been repeated and Germany's position would have been stronger than ever. Victory in Palestine and the defection of Bulgaria came in the very nick of time.

Just when Germany began to fear a great military disaster in France, Austria threatened to go the way of Bulgaria. An armistice was absolutely necessary both to gain time to reform on a shorter front and to keep Austria in the Central Alliance. These facts are the key of the whole situation. Germany's tone stiffened as the fear of a military disaster in the west receded, and therefore it is absolutely necessary to keep up military pressure now. The burden is a heavy one, but it must be shouldered, for every victory won now has many times its normal and intrinsic effect on the morale of the enemy.

An Italian offensive would assist greatly in driving home our eastern victories. The American army against the hinge of the German retreat has had an exceptionally difficult position, and if its progress has not been equal to the exacting demands of Foch's strategy or to the incomparable quality of its human material, that is no cause for discouragement. The Germans always held that it took a generation to grow the brain of a modern army of millions. We did it in three years, America will do it in less, but it is necessary that we should all apply quite remorselessly the doctrine of a united front, and that the fullest possibilities should be made by the American army, as it has been by English and French Staff work, now at its highest point of perfection.

As Marshal Saxe once said, an army marches on its stomach, and the chief determining condition of an army's advance is not the valor of the soldiers, or even the excellence of divisional tactics, but the perfection of administrative routine in the rear. This is only to be attained by long experience in handling vast armies, for which no natural genius, no gifts of extemporization, can be an adequate substitute. The service rendered by the American army in Argonne in holding large numbers of German troops has been invaluable. The situation is not unlike that at the end of America's Civil War when Grant said he held Lee while Sherman skinned him. Pershing is in Grant's position, the British and Belgians in northern France and Flanders are in Sherman's.

The chief military happening of the week has been the development of a new attack by the British Third and Fourth armies, later assisted by the brilliant work of the American divisions against the centre of the trunk railway from Lille to Hirson. We cannot carry these great industrial towns by storm, but must manœuvre the enemy out of them. As we manœuvred him out of Lille, so now we are manœuvring him out of Valenciennes by an attack directed towards Bavay and Maubeuge. A gap has been torn in the German river system of defense between the Scheldt and the Sambre, but this gap is defended by many cross streams, and above all by the great forest of Mormal. One by one these cross streams have been forced. It is out of the question that we should enter the forest of Mormal.

We are slowly working our way up the western side. It is terribly difficult work, and the enemy is fighting desperately, but thousands of prisoners and guns attest the measure of success. If the attacks can be kept up, we shall turn the forest of Mormal and thereby manœuvre the enemy out of Valenciennes to the west, and Bavay and Maubeuge to the east. That will further give us access to the valley of the Sambre, which, be it remembered, joins the Meuse at Namur. The Germans are therefore extremely sensitive about any menace to the valley of the lower Sambre.

American troops fighting in the Argonne and on the Meuse are particularly interested in the event of this battle between the Scheldt and the Sambre, for if all went well it might bring us out on the northeastern flank of the Germans who are fighting so desperately against the Americans in Argonne. That again suggests the parallel of Grant and Sherman, and if this chance of cooperation between the Americans on the Meuse and the British in the Sambre Valley is fulfilled it would be a glorious page in the history of our countries and of the whole world.

HERBERT SIDEBOTHAM.

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An American Crown Prince

The Magnificent Ambersons, by Booth Tarkington. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. $1.75.

AN America enslaved to money provides Mr. Tarkington with his theme. He goes back a generation, to that booming period when lucky men rolled into wealth and immediately undertook to live up to it. What Mr. Tarkington calls a "midland city," for want of a better adjective, is the scene of his story, and he makes one family, the Ambersons, a funnel through which to pour the history of an epoch. Theirs is local dominance, florid and preposterous in perspective but quite stylish and "magnificent" at the time. Major Amberson makes his fortune in real estate in 1873 or thereabouts. His is the Amberson Mansion and the Amberson Addition, and it is he who gives his name to Amberson Boulevard. By the mere weight of his magnificence as well as by a kind and confident management of it he comes to be regarded as dynastic. His only grandson, George Amberson Minifer, is the final heir to these presumptions and the particular subject of Mr. Tarkington's art.

It is a rich subject. Repeatedly in American life the heavy manure of wealth has been pitchforked on to unprepared soil and over and over again the drama of the prodigal has been enacted. Whether the lucky family ends by building its monument on Fifth avenue, after the sublime example of Senator Clarke, or acquires Italian or Polish or Austrian sons-in-law, or takes it out in horses or yachts, the common accident of money plus unpreparedness has invariably created an interesting situation. It is the suddenness of acquisition that makes the situation. People bred to produce find themselves ill-bred to distribute, and they are called upon to distribute "magnificently." The idiom of their love-making is not less determined by their affluence than the type of their politics, or the manner of their dealing with schoolmasters and taskmasters and dependents. Soon, under all their sportiness, there comes to be a lack of hardihood. While the beginning of the trouble is a deficiency in moral direction rather than moral quality, the quality can scarcely keep from deteriorating. There is seldom any disinterested relation to life to relieve the tedium or soften the impact of a class existence, and once dependence on wealth is fully established anything that may prove inimical to wealth becomes reprehensible. The outcome is sometimes more suitable for the pathologist than for the novelist, but it is seldom wanting in salience.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Tarkington is, on the whole, so sentimentally interested. So far as familiarity with his theme is concerned, he holds it in the hollow of his hand. He has not simply seen the Amberson Mansion from the outside, with its Fountain of Neptune on the lawn. He has been right into it. He knows the great ball where the old granduncle distresses the college Hyperion. He knows the age of serenade and New Year's party, the age of tandems and surreys and cutters and "git a hoss." He has understood the households ruled by a benevolent despot, with a son and his stately wife that only ask an embassy as their plaything, and a daughter that is content with an unlimited bank account and another son, the man with a light touch, who is amused to dabble expensively in financeering. Almost nothing that is necessary to creating a study of this American reality is lacking in Mr. Tarkington except the temper of a master novelist.

A complacent disillusionment about human nature, youth and age, etc., is not, after all, the height of philosophy. A tender externality about the good woman is not the last word as to that particular cult. But while Mr. Tarkington does incline toward the conventional his worst artistic fault is a suave explicitness carried to the point of boredom, as if it were better style to be empty and easy than to be compact and curt. After these animadversions, however, it is necessary to dwell on the finished portraiture of that typical American Crown Prince, the spoiled George Amberson Minifer. In the unfolding of his character and the stress on the ugly consequences of its indulgence Mr. Tarkington deserves to be hung on the line. A more unsparing novelist would have shown George's indulgent mother to be, first of all, a stupid woman. Because Eugene serenades her when he is tipsy and puts his hoof through the bass viol, she marries a man whom she doesn't love. And when that man dies and she is on the verge of marrying Eugene, she allows the perversity of her boy, George, to dictate a second desertion. That sort of cowardice is scarcely compatible with intelligence, and George's mother needed a more bitter novelist than Mr. Tarkington. The boy's redemption, likewise, is a little like romanticizing. When everything goes smash this youth immediately seeks employment in a nitro-glycerine factory and turns out to be quite all right. Not only all right but still the favorite of fortune, because Eugene, now a millionaire, receives word from George's departed mother—"Be kind, be kind." These are traces of old-fashioned Victorianism in 1918. But while Mr. Tarkington is superficial and compliant in these respects he does exhibit in a large variety of ways the special idiosyncrasies of endowed American youth, as well as the quick transition of American fortune. Nothing that George does fails to be readily conceivable. He is obviously

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a young lord of creation. He thinks of ordinary folk as "riffraff." He is cocky and unbridled and pugnacious, with no glimmer of the rights of anyone else. The good stuff in him is unfortunately not amply illustrated in advance of the denouement, but Mr. Tarkington has been lavish in illustrating the other characteristics, clear even to the eyes of the charmed but sane young girl who loves him. Mr. Tarkington accurately portrays his youth as a person without a glint of humor. This lack of humor, and good humor, is so colossal that even hardship seems unlikely to be corrective. But Mr. Tarkington believes it will be corrective, and long before George gets what he deserves we know he is destined for it. This is part of the story's necessary limitation. It has laughs but little laughter. It runs on the iron rim of seriousness.

It is the merit of The Magnificent Ambersons that Mr. Tarkington, steady and serious and explanatory, has carved his own theme out of native material. He has contributed, though by an old method, to that great change which is taking place in American fiction—its Americanization. He has rescued a bit of America from the black maw of time.

Only by slow degrees is ordinary America being conquered for American fiction. Even still, good novelists refuse to see, or fail to see, the familiar mise-en-scène. Reared on a literature which took cognizance of an entirely different set of circumstances, which identified those foreign circumstances with "real" literature, it has been next to impossible for young Americans to avail themselves of their own singularly incorrect experiences. Those experiences as a rule have not only lain outside the realm of known literature, they have lain outside the realm of æsthetic influence and they have set literary teeth on edge. The things among which middle-class American novelists have been brought up, the things with which they have had deep familiarity, and for which they have felt positive personal emotions, have not seemed reputable to timid professorial criticism. Ordinary democratic American experience stood against glamorous European experience as a man in a business suit among medalled and spurred and cockaded veterans. The outcome of this literary contrast was, only too often, a protective romanticism. The American novel did very little better than American architecture. New England fiction had to be chaste and Greek and domestic. Southern fiction had to be feudal and picturesque. Western fiction had to be log-cabin or baroque. The emotional history of the authors, the stuff of daily existence, was excluded from general consideration. For the Middle West especially, outside a few disfavored writers, knighthood had to be perennially in flower.

A great change is now in slow process, a change by which ordinary America is being conquered for the novel, and to this change The Magnificent Ambersons is a plain contribution. It is not so large a contribution, perhaps, as it might have been if Mr. Tarkington had had less sentiment for American mothers and American amenities and the general system of amiable narcotic lying that a damnable era in squalid bourgeois materialism requires. But however much American docility there is in the novel, the mass of its creation is altogether too considerable not to put it in the class of high achievement. Its achievement is not so much in pointed detail or penetrating phrase as in the exhaustive revelation of a thoroughly significant national type. It is the understanding of this type and its contingent epoch that makes the story so genuine, so relevant and so focal.

F. H.

Creative Industry

Creative Impulse in Industry, a Proposition for Educators, by Helen Marot. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.

THIS book has ideas in abundance. Since it is composed of less than one hundred and fifty pages, this means that it is intellectually compact. Writers whose own intellectual store compels them to great thrift in order to make a showing would make a number of bulky volumes out of the material Miss Marot exposes. The reviewer could easily fill his allotted space by amplifying such texts as these: "Every established institution contributes fixed ideas as well as fixed customs and rules of action. Schools and colleges circulate and interpret them." "The absence of fear rather than the absence of work determines the capacity of men to play." "Undigested relationships are today the outstanding menace to civilization." "A society too enfeebled to use its own experience will not have the power to use the experience of another people or time"—a saying that embodies the best way I recall of disposing of the gentry who would cure the ills of the present by recourse to the habitudes of the past. But while, I hope, such isolated extracts may send the reader to the book from which they are drawn, they do not do justice to the main idea of the book and the forceful skill with which it is developed. So it may be enough to remark that without any flourish of psychology this book contains more sound social psychology, more insight into the workings of human nature, than the professed treatises on the psychology of industry and trade. For it is written from the standpoint of common, that is, universal, human nature, and not from the standpoint of the employer who wants to get all he can out of his labor force, or of the salesman who has goods to sell at a profit.

In her own language, the proposition which Miss Marot presents to educators is that "it is for educators, together with engineers and architects, to demonstrate to the world that while the idea of service to a political state may have the power to accomplish large results, all productive force is artificially sustained which is not dependent on men's desire to do creative work." At present we do not seem to be even aware that industry is the great field for adventure and growth, because we use that field for purposes of exploitation, the capitalist and the laborer alike at the present time being interested in work and materials not for what can really be *made* out of them, but for what can be *got* out of them either for purposes of personal enjoyment or, as in Germany, for the ulterior purposes of political empire. As a consequence the industrial arrangement is carried on not only without the force of productive or creative intention, but against a disinclination to produce. This is the final indictment of our present industrial order.

Educators have largely opposed the attempts to vocationalize education because those who have, with the greatest prestige, urged the movement have merely attempted to harness schools to the existing régime of "business." Hardly more than business men themselves have they been able to conceive of industry which is not subjected to business or money-making, industry carried on for the sake of developing productive initiative and ability. Even the movement for "scientific management" got no further in its psychology than the importance of standardizing methods of production; it never perceived the importance of enlisting the cooperation of the workers in discovering and fixing these standards for themselves. It

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The New Knowledge



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has relied upon external incentives; it has not had the courage or the wisdom to make use of the incentive, the stimulus, which resides in productive work itself. As education is undergoing transformation by transferring itself from reliance upon external incentives of reward and punishment to reliance upon intrinsic interest in initiative and accomplishment, so must industry be transformed. But the first step is for educators to cease taking industry at the valuation to which its pecuniary exploiters have reduced it, to perceive its possibilities for promoting growth, and then to organize schools—especially those for adolescents—upon the basis of productive industry, just as the most vital schools for little children are organized upon the basis of creative play.

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Owing to the scarcity of paper, the Index for Volume XVI, which was completed with the last number, has been printed separately. It will be mailed on request, post free, to any subscriber who will send his name and address on a post card directed to the New Republic, 421 West 21st street, New York City.

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

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

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